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Abstract
Using a sequential model of multilateral bargaining involving one buyer and two sellers,
who are selling objects which are imperfect compliments for the buyer, we analyse buyer’s
preferred bargaining order i.e. whether the buyer prefers to buy higher valuation object first
or second. For a narrow range of parameters, where players are patient enough and objects
exhibit high degree of complimentarity, multiple equilibria exist such that both the bargaining
orders are preferred. For rest of the range, which is relatively much larger, buyer prefers to
buy higher valuation object first.
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1 Introduction
We analyse a model of multilateral bargaining in which one buyer negotiates with two sellers, each
of whom own an unit object. These objects are imperfect complements ie each object is valuable
to the buyer, however owning both the objects is the most desirable. We consider a general case
in which one object is more valuable to the buyer than the other. Using a sequential bargaining
model we attempt to know which bargaining order buyer prefers ie would he like to buy from
the seller holding more valuable object first or from the seller holding low value object first. We
characterize the conditions under which buyer prefers one order over the other. For most of the
range of parameters, buyer prefers to buy higher valuation object first. However, for a narrow
range of parameters, multiple equilibria exist such that some support one order, while the rest
support the other order. Our main results are captured in the propositions 6 and 7.
While most of the literature on multilateral bargaining concerns with inefficiency and multiplic-
ity of equilibria1, Xiao(2010), Shubhro(2016), and Krastiv and Yildrim (2009) study bargaining
order. Using different models, Xiao(2010) and Shubhro(2016) characterize the conditions under
which buyer prefers one seller over another. Note that the bargaining order in these papers is
based on the sellers’ valuation of their objects, while in ours it is based on the buyer’s valuation
of the objects. Hence, in our model the objects cannot be perfect compliments, while they are
in Xiao(2010) and Shubhro(2016). Krastiv and Yildrim (2009) study buyer’s preferred bargaining
order based on the bargaining power of the sellers which is measured as their chance of being the
proposer in a one shot bargaining with the buyer. Key features of our model are sequential bar-
gaining of infinite periods and binding offers. Both these features are quiet the norm in multilateral
bargaining literature.2 In next section we describe the model, which we analyse in section 3. We
conclude in the section 4.
2 Model
One buyer negotiates with two sellers, denoted by s1 and s2, to buy each of the objects owned
by them. Both objects are imperfect complements. Buyer’s utility from owning the objects is the
following. v(1)=u < 1, v(2)=0 and v(1,2)=1, where v(1), v(2) and v(1,2) are buyer’s utility when
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1See Cai(2000, 2003), Krishna and Serrano(1996), Roy Chaudhury and Sengupta(2012).
2See Cai(2000, 2003), Roy Chaudhury and Sengupta(2012), Xiao(2010) and Shubhro(2016).
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he owns s1’s object, s2’s object and both the objects respectively. The bargaining game consists
of infinite rounds. Each round has a maximum of two periods, in first of which the buyer makes
an offer to a seller and the seller responds with acceptance or rejection of the same. In the second
period of the round, the seller demands a price (counter-offer) and the buyer responds. The buyer
switches to the other seller in the next round. Hence, the game may possibly continue for infinite
rounds (and periods). If an offer or counter-offer is accepted, the buyer makes the payment to the
respective seller, who in turn leaves the game, and the game enters the next round. Game ends
when the buyer buys both the objects. All players are risk neutral and discount at the rate of
δ ∈ (0, 1) per period. We use Markov Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, henceforth equilibrium,
as the solution concept.
3 Analysis
Following two lemmas are the minor results.
Lemma 1. Perpetual disagreement is not possible in equilibrium.
Proof. See Cai (2000, lemma 4).
Lemma 2. In every equilibrium, the buyer buys both the objects in consecutive periods.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium. The buyer must acquire an object, say in period t. This follows
from the lemma 1. The subsequent subgame is a Rubinstein(1982) game with immediate outcome.
Hence, the second object is obtained by the buyer in the period t+1.
We now analyse the game in which the buyer negotiates with the seller 1 in the first period.
Following five propositions characterize all the equilibria of the game. The proofs follow same
methodology as employed in Shubhro(2016), from which we borrow the following notations as
well.
An equilibrium profile is described by 8 parameters- o1, oˆ1, co1, ˆco1, o2, oˆ2, co2, and ˆco2.
Buyer offers o1 to seller 1 in the first period. oˆ1 is the minimum offer from the buyer which the
seller 1 is willing to accept. In the second period, seller 1 counter-offers co1 to himself. The buyer
rejects any counter-offer more than ˆco1 from the seller 1. Similarly, in third period, buyer offers o2
to seller 2, who accepts any offer at least as much as oˆ2. The seller 2 counter-offers co2 to himself
in the fourth period. The buyer rejects any counter-offer more than ˆco2 from the seller 2.
Equilibrium payoff is denoted by {pb, p1, p2, t}, where the first three terms are the payoffs to
the buyer, the sellers s1 and s2 respectively as seen from period t. We chose the period of the first
purchase as t. Note that the counting of the periods start with 1 ( not 0).
Proposition 1. For u(δ5+δ4+δ3+δ2−1) ≥ δ5+δ4+δ3−1, following strategy profile constitutes
an equilibrium. We denote this equilibrium by E1.
o1 = oˆ1 o2 = oˆ2
oˆ1 = δ ˆco1 oˆ2 = δ ˆco2
co1 = ˆco1 co2 = ˆco2
ˆco1 =
u(1+δ+δ2)+δ(1+δ2)
(1+δ)2(1+δ2) ˆco2 =
δ+δ3−δu
(1+δ)2(1+δ2)
Equilibrium payoff is {u+δ1+δ − o1, o1, δ
2
1+δ (1− u), 1}.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 2. For u(δ2 + δ3 − δ − δ7) ≤ δ2 + δ4 − δ − δ7 ∪ u(δ + δ7 − δ2 − δ3) ≤ 1− δ2 − δ4 +
δ7 ∪ u(1− δ5) ≥ δ2 + δ3 − δ − δ5, following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium. We denote
this equilibrium by E2.
o1 = oˆ1 o2 = oˆ2
oˆ1 = δ ˆco1 oˆ2 =
δ4
1+δ (1− u)
co1 = ˆco1 co2 > ˆco2
ˆco1=
u(1−δ5)+δ+δ5−δ2
1+δ ˆco2=
δ
1+δ (u(δ − δ6 − 1) + 1− δ − δ3 + δ2 + δ6)
2
Equilibrium payoff is {u+δ1+δ − o1, o1, δ
2
1+δ (1− u), 1}.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 3. For u(1−δ5) ≤ δ2+δ3−δ−δ5, following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium.
We denote this equilibrium by E3.
o1 = oˆ1 o2 = oˆ2
oˆ1= δ
4
1+δ oˆ2 =
δ4
1+δ (1− u)
co1 > ˆco1 co2 > ˆco2
ˆco1=u+δ1+δ − δ
2
1+δ +
δ5
1+δ (1− u) ˆco2 = δ1+δ (1− u− δ) + δ
5
1+δ
Equilibrium payoff is {u+δ1+δ − o1, o1, δ
2
1+δ (1− u), 1}.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 4. For u(δ + δ7 − δ2 − δ3) ≥ 1 − δ2 − δ4 + δ7, following strategy profile constitutes
an equilibrium. We denote this equilibrium by E4.
o1 = oˆ1 o2 < oˆ2
oˆ1 = δ ˆco1 oˆ2 =
δ4
1+δ (1− u)
co1 = ˆco1 co2 > ˆco2
ˆco1=(u+δ1+δ )(
1−δ3
1−δ4 ) ˆco2=
δ
1+δ (1− u− δ) + δ2(u+δ1+δ )( 1−δ
3
1−δ4 )
Equilibrium payoff is {u+δ1+δ − o1, o1, δ
2
1+δ (1− u), 1}.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 5. For u(1−δ4) ≤ δ3+δ5−δ−δ8, following strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium.
We denote this equilibrium by E5.
o1 < oˆ1 o2 = oˆ2
oˆ1 =
δ4
1+δ oˆ2 = δ ˆco2
co1 > ˆco1 co2 = ˆco2
ˆco1 =
u(1−δ4)+δ(1−δ)(1−δ4)+δ3(1−δ3)
(1+δ)(1−δ4) ˆco2 = (
δ
1+δ )(
1−δ3
1−δ4 )
Equilibrium payoff is { δ1+δ − o2, δ
2
1+δ , o2, 3}.
Proof. See the appendix.
Figure 1 summarizes the above propositions (equilibria).
Note that in the equilibrium E1 all the offers and counter offers are accepted. The equilibrium E1
exists for low values of δ or high values of u. When players are impatient, they would not like to
wait, and they would be eager to make deals as soon as possible. Hence, E1 exists for low values
of δ. Whereas E2 to E5 exist for high value of δ, and consequently some of the offers and counter
offers are rejected. In E2, all the offers and counter-offers are accepted except for co2, which is
rejected. In E3, both the offers are accepted, while both the counter-offers are rejected. In E4, o1
and co1 are accepted, while o2 and co2 are rejected. In E5, o1 and co1 are rejected, while o2 and
co2 are accepted.
Note that the above propositions (1 to 5) also characterize the set of equilibria of the
game in which buyer starts the negotiations with the seller s2. Only difference is that
of the payoffs. By comparing these payoffs, we can evaluate buyer’s preferred bargaining order.
Following two propositions present the corresponding results, which are the main findings of this
paper.
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Figure 1: (a) All the 5 equilibria and the respective range of parameter values for which they are
applicable. (b) Magnified view of the right hand side and bottom corner of figure (a). Coordinates
of points A, B, C, D and E are (0.755, 0), (0.913, 0), (1, 0.20), (1, 0.25) and (1, 0.33) respectively.
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Proposition 6. For For u(1− δ4) ≥ δ3 + δ5 − δ − δ8, the buyer prefers to buy from s1, the seller
with higher valuation object, first.
Proof. In the parameter range defined above, equilibrium E1, E2, E3 and E4 are applicable. See
figure 1. It can be verified that buyer obtains higher payoff if he buys from s1 first in all these
equilibria. See the appendix for calculations.
Proposition 7. For For u(1 − δ4) ≤ δ3 + δ5 − δ − δ8, there exist equilibria such that both the
bargaining orders are supported.
Proof. In the parameter range defined above, equilibria E3, E4 and E5 overlap. See figure 1. In E3
and E4, the buyer obtains higher payoff if he buys from s1 first. In E5, the buyer obtains higher
payoff if he buys from s2 first. See the appendix for calculations.
Clearly, buyer prefers to buy high utility object first, except when players are sufficiently patient
and objects are sufficiently closer to being perfect compliments (i.e. low u), in which case there
exists equilibria such that both the bargaining orders are supported. The intuition behind the
result is following. In the zone where both the bargaining orders are supported in equilibrium,
there exist two equilibria such that in each of them, one of the sellers hold out ie unwilling to sell
first. Hence each equilibrium supports one of the bargaining orders. The reason a seller holds out
is the lucrative Rubinstein(1982) payoff available to the seller who sells last. For low values of δ,
the Rubinstein payoff is poor, hence the sellers would not like to wait or hold out. Also, for high
value of u, both sellers have low incentive to hold out. If the seller s1 sells first, the bargaining is
over a surplus of u + δ(1−u)1+δ =
u+δ
1+δ . If he waits and sells second, the bargaining is over a surplus
of unity. Clearly, for high enough u, the waiting is unlikely to be lucrative. If s2 sells first, he is
bargaining over a surplus of δ1+δ , which is discounted value of the payoff available to the buyer in
the Rubinstein bargaining with s1. If he holds out and goes second, he is bargaining over a surplus
of 1− u. Clearly, for high u, selling second is not lucrative for s2. Hence, only when δ is high and
u is low enough, the sellers have incentive to hold out and obtain the Rubinstein payoff. Hence
the multiple equilibria supporting both the bargaining orders exist in the corresponding zone.
4 Conclusion
We study a model of multilateral bargaining in which a buyer attempts to buy objects from
two sellers. The objects are imperfect compliments for the buyer. We enquire buyer’s preferred
bargaining order ie whether buyer prefers to buy the higher valuation object first or the lower
valuation object first. For most of the range of the parameters, buyer prefers to buy higher
valuation object first. However, for a narrow range of parameters which involves high discount
factor and high degree of complimentarity, multiple equilibria exist such that both the bargaining
orders are supported.
5 Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
It is an infinite game, in which the game repeats after every 4 periods. Since we focus on Markov
SPNE only, the strategies repeat after every 4 periods. Hence, we need to describe equilibrium
strategies for first 4 periods only. In the first 4 periods a total of 4 offers and counter-offers are
made. Hence, depending upon various combinations of offers and counter-offers being accepted or
rejected, the total number of possible outcomes is 24 = 16. Out of these 16, only 5 outcomes (E1
to E5) are possible in equilibrium. The remaining 11 outcomes are not possible in equilibrium.
Let us construct equilibrium E1(described in proposition 1) in which all the 4 offers
and counter-offers are accepted. We use following 8 steps (a to h) to construct the equilib-
rium. These 8 steps give us values of 8 parameters and 4 inequalities. These 8 parameters are
o1, oˆ1, co1, ˆco1, o2, oˆ2, co2, and ˆco2 (see section 3 for the description of these parameters). The 4
inequalitites are the constraints to which the equilibrium is subjected. When these 4 inequalities
together represent an area or a line or a point, the equilibrium exists, otherwise the corresponding
"equilibrium" does not exist. This is how it can be shown that 5 out of 16 outcomes exist as
equilibria, and the rest of 11 outcomes do not form equilibria.
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a) Consider period 4. Let ˆco2 be the seller 2’s counteroffer for which the buyer is indifferent
between accepting and rejecting it. What is the buyer’s payoff when he accepts ˆco2? Buyer pays
ˆco2 in the current period and receives the Rubinstein(1982) payoff of 11+δ in the next period. Hence,
his net payoff is x = δ1+δ − ˆco2. What is the buyer’s payoff when he rejects ˆco2? Current period is
wasted since the buyer rejects the counter-offer. In the next period the buyer pays o1 to seller 1
(as all 4 offers and counter-offers are accepted in E1) and receives u. In the next period, the buyer
receives the Rubinstein payoff of 1−u1+δ . Hence, his net payoff is y =
δ2(1−u)
1+δ + δu− δo1. By equating
x and y, we get an equation for ˆco2.
x = y =⇒
ˆco2 =
δ
1 + δ
− δ
2(1− u)
1 + δ
− δu+ δo1 (1)
b) Consider period 4. Since all 4 offers and counter-offers are accepted in E1, co2 must be accepted.
Therefore, the seller s2 must counter-offer the maximum the buyer accepts. This implies,
co2 = ˆco2 (2)
What is the s2’s payoff if he counter-offers more than ˆco2? The current period is wasted since the
counter-offer is rejected by the buyer. In the next period the buyer pays o1 to seller 1 (as all 4
offers and counter-offers are accepted in E1). In the next period, the s2 receives the Rubinstein
payoff of x = δ(1−u)1+δ . Since the seller counter-offers himself ˆco2, following inequality must hold.
ˆco2 ≥ δ2x =⇒
ˆco2 ≥ δ
3(1− u)
1 + δ
(I.1)
c) Consider period 3. Since s2 receives ˆco2 in period 4, he will reject any offer below δ ˆco2 in period
3. Therefore,
oˆ2 = δ ˆco2 (3)
d) Consider period 3. Since o2 is accepted in E1, we have,
o2 = oˆ2 (4)
What is the buyer’s payoff when he offers oˆ2? Buyer pays oˆ2 = δ ˆco2 in the current period and
obtains Rubinstein payoff of 11+δ in the next period. His net payoff is x =
δ
1+δ − δ ˆco2. What is the
buyer’s payoff if he offers less than oˆ2? In that case, his offer is rejected. In the next period, he
pays ˆco2 to s2. In the subsequent period he obtains the Rubinstein payoff of 11+δ . His net payoff
is y = δ
2
1+δ − δ ˆco2. Since the buyer offers oˆ2, following inequality must hold.
x ≥ y
=⇒ δ1+δ − δ ˆco2 ≥ δ
2
1+δ − δ ˆco2
=⇒ δ1+δ ≥ δ
2
1+δ
=⇒
1 ≥ δ (I.2)
Above inequality is true for all values of δ.
e) Consider period 2. Let ˆco1 be the seller 1’s counteroffer for which the buyer is indifferent
between accepting and rejecting it. What is the buyer’s payoff when he accepts ˆco1? Buyer pays
ˆco1 in the current period and receives u. Also, he receives the Rubinstein(1982) payoff of 1−u1+δ in
the next period. Hence, his net payoff is x = u+ δ(1−u)1+δ − ˆco1. What is the buyer’s payoff when he
rejects ˆco1? Current period is wasted since the buyer rejects the counter-offer. In the next period
the buyer pays o2 to seller 2 (as all 4 offers and counter-offers are accepted in E1). In the next
period, the buyer receives the Rubinstein payoff of 11+δ . Hence, his net payoff is y =
δ2
1+δ − δo2.
By equating x and y, we get an equation for ˆco1.
x = y =⇒
ˆco1 = u+
δ(1− u)
1 + δ
− δ
2
1 + δ
+ δo2 (5)
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f) Consider period 2. Since all 4 offers and counter-offers are accepted in E1, co1 must be accepted.
Therefore, the seller s1 must counter-offer the maximum the buyer accepts. This implies,
co1 = ˆco1 (6)
What is the seller’s payoff if he counter-offers more than ˆco1? The current period is wasted since
the counter-offer is rejected by the buyer. In the next period the buyer pays o2 to seller 2 (as all
4 offers and counter-offers are accepted in E1). In the next period, the s1 receives the Rubinstein
payoff of x = δ1+δ . Since the seller counter-offers himself ˆco1, following inequality must hold.
ˆco1 ≥ δ2x =⇒
ˆco1 ≥ δ
3
1 + δ
(I.3)
g) Consider period 1. Since s1 receives ˆco1 in period 2, he will reject any offer below δ ˆco1 in period
1. Therefore,
oˆ1 = δ ˆco1 (7)
h) Consider period 1. Since o1 is accepted in E1, we have,
o1 = oˆ1 (8)
What is the buyer’s payoff when he offers oˆ1? Buyer pays oˆ1 = δ ˆco1 and receives u in the current
period and obtains Rubinstein payoff of 1−u1+δ in the next period. His net payoff is x =
δ(1−u)
1+δ +u−
δ ˆco1. What is buyer’s payoff if he offers less than oˆ1? In that case, his offer is rejected. In the next
period, he pays ˆco1 to s1 and receives u. In the subsequent period he obtains the Rubinstein payoff
of 1−u1+δ . His net payoff is y =
δ2(1−u)
1+δ + δu − δ ˆco1. Since the buyer offers oˆ1, following inequality
must hold.
x ≥ y
=⇒ δ(1−u)1+δ + u− δ ˆco1 ≥ δ
2(1−u)
1+δ + δu− δ ˆco1
=⇒ δ(1−u)1+δ + u ≥ δ
2(1−u)
1+δ + δu
=⇒
δ(1− u)(1− δ)
1 + δ
≥ u(δ − 1) (I.4)
The above inequality is true for all values of δ and u.
We have 8 equations, numbered 1 to 8, in 8 variables, which upon solving gives us the values
of o1, oˆ1, co1, ˆco1, o2, oˆ2, co2, and ˆco2. Also, we have 4 inequalities, labeled I.1 to I.4. Inequalities
I.2 and I.4 are true for entire range of parameter values of u and δ. Hence, these inequalities
can be ignored. After substituting the values of variables, the inequalities I.1 and I.3 become -
u(δ3 + δ4 + δ5 + δ6 − δ) ≥ δ4 + δ5 + δ6 − δ and u(1 + δ+ δ2) ≥ δ4 + δ5 + δ6 − δ respectively. It can
be verified that the first inequality makes the second inequality redundant. Hence, E1 is confined
to the area represented by the first inequality.
Proof of propositions 2 to 5
Using arguments similar to those used in the steps a to h in the proof of the proposition 1, propo-
sitions 2 to 5 can be proved. Using same methodology it can be shown that the rest of the 11
outcomes out of 16 possibilities cannot be supported in equilibrium.
Proof of propositions 6 and 7
Bargaining order 1 refers to the game in which s1 is the first seller to negotiate with the buyer.
Similarly, bargaining order 2 refers to the game in which s2 is the first seller to negotiate with the
buyer. Let B1,i and B2,i denote buyer’s payoff in bargaining order 1 and 2 respectively in the equi-
librium Ei. Now we compare buyer’s payoffs in both the bargaining orders in each of the equilibria.
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(i) Claim: B1,1 > B2,1.
B1,1 =
u+δ
1+δ − o1
B2,1 =
δ
1+δ − o2
Let us assume B1,1 > B2,1 is false.
B1,1 > B2,1 =⇒ u+δ1+δ − o1 > δ1+δ − o2
=⇒
u
1 + δ
> o1 − o2 (9)
ˆco1 − ˆco2 = u1+δ + δu1+δ + δ(o2 − o1)
⇐⇒ ˆco1 − ˆco2 = u− δ2( ˆco1 − ˆco2)
⇐⇒ ˆco1 − ˆco2 = u1+δ2
⇐⇒ o1 − o2 = δu1+δ2
Substituting the value of o1 − o2 in the equation 9, we get,
u
1+δ >
δu
1+δ2
=⇒ 1 > δ , which must be false because of our assumption. This is a contradiction since we know
that the statement is true for all values of δ. Hence our assumption must be false, and the claim
must be true.
(ii) Claim: B1,2 > B2,2.
B1,2 =
u+δ
1+δ − o1
B2,2 =
δ
1+δ − o2
Let us assume B1,2 > B2,2 is false.
B1,2 > B2,2 =⇒ u1+δ > o1 − o2 = δ ˆco1 − o2
=⇒ u1+δ > δ u(1−δ
5)+δ+δ5−δ2
1+δ − δ
4(1−u)
1+δ
=⇒
u(1 + δ6 − δ − δ4) > δ2 + δ6 − δ3 − δ4 (10)
Because of our assumption, the above inequality, equation 10, must not hold over the entire range
of parameter values for which E2 is applicable.
Let δ0 be the solution of the equation δ2 + δ3 − 1 = 0. This implies δ0 ≈ 0.755. Let δ1 be the
solution of the equation x = 1 + δ6 − δ − δ4 = 0. This implies δ1 ≈ 0.857.
Statement A: For δ > δ1, x < 0 =⇒ u < δ2+δ6−δ3−δ41+δ6−δ−δ4 = y, say.
Statement B: For δ < δ1, x > 0 =⇒ u > δ2+δ6−δ3−δ41+δ6−δ−δ4 .
Statement C: It can be verified that y > 1 for δ ∈ [δ1, 1), and y < 0 for δ ∈ (δ0, δ1). Also, it can be
verified that E2 exists for δ ∈ (δ0, 1).
Statement A, B and C together proves that the inequality (equation 10) holds for the entire range
of the parameter values for which E2 is applicable. This proves the claim by contradiction.
(iii) Claim: B1,3 > B2,3.
B1,3 =
u+δ
1+δ − o1 = u+δ1+δ − δ
4
1+δ
B2,3 =
δ
1+δ − o2 = δ1+δ − δ
4(1−u)
1+δ
Let us assume that B1,3 > B2,3 is false. This implies that 1 > δ4 is false, which is a contradiction.
This contradiction means that our assumption is false. Hence, the claim is proved by contradiction.
(iv) Claim: B1,4 > B2,4.
B1,4 =
u+δ
1+δ − o1
B2,4 = δ
2(u+δ1+δ − o1)
Let us assume that B1,4 > B2,4 is false. This implies that 1 > δ2 is false, which is a contradiction.
This contradiction means that our assumption is false. Hence, the claim is proved by contradiction.
(v) Claim: B2,5 > B2,5.
B1,5 = δ
2( δ1+δ − o2)
B2,5 =
δ
1+δ − o2
Let us assume that B2,5 > B1,5 is false. This implies that 1 > δ2 is false, which is a contradiction.
This contradiction means that our assumption is false. Hence, the claim is proved by contradiction.
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